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The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs
Don't Work
Mary Jean Dolan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1 ("Illinois RFRA") is
one of the first of a growing number of similar state statutes that seek to
replace a substantially identical federal law that was held
unconstitutional. 2 The Illinois General Assembly passed the act by an
overwhelming margin on December 2, 1998, and made it effective as of
July 1, 1998. 3 The purpose of all of these RFRAs is to codify a standard
of review for religious freedom claims. The RFRA test provides that
the government may not substantially burden any conduct motivated by
a person's religious beliefs, even where doing so is the unintentional
result of a general law, unless the government can prove that the
application of the law is the least restrictive means of furthering a
4
compelling governmental interest.
The concept of a religious freedom restoration act began as the
congressional response to the much-criticized Supreme Court decision
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.5
Smith rejected the free exercise claims of two Native Americans who
. Of counsel to the City of Chicago Law Department. B.A. 1981, University of Notre
Dame;
J.D. 1984, Northwestern University. I would like to thank Tom Berg, Marci Hamilton, Rich
Lewis, Tom Merrill, and Larry Rosenthal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The opinions expressed in this Article are entirely my own and should not be attributed to the City of Chicago.
1. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-99 (West Supp. 1999). The author refers to this statute by its
official name, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("Illinois RFRA").
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. On November 17, 1998, with a vote of 110-3-1, the House overrode Governor Edgar's
amendatory veto, which had exempted prisons from the requirements of the Act. See 12 Legis.
Synopsis & Dig. 2516 (Ill. 1999). The Senate followed with a vote of 55-0-2 on December 2,
1998. See id.
4. See 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 35/15.
5. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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broke Oregon's criminal law by using peyote in a sacred ritual and,
subsequently, were denied unemployment compensation. Rather than

recognizing a compelling interest in enforcing drug laws that
outweighed free exercise rights, the Smith Court pronounced its holding
as a categorical rule: The Free Exercise Clause is not violated where the
burden on religious conduct is merely an incidental effect of a generally
6
applicable, neutral law.
The federal RFRA, like its state counterparts, sought to eviscerate
Smith and restore what proponents refer to as the pre-Smith standard:
the "compelling interest/least restrictive means" test found in Sherbert
v. Verner 7 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.8 The federal RFRA strict scrutiny
test produced some notorious results, such as: (1) the Ninth Circuit's
decision to uphold the right of Sikh Khalsa children to wear daggers to
school; 9 (2) the insulation of a Native American who killed a bald eagle
from criminal conviction under the endangered species law; 10 and (3)
the Vermont Supreme Court's decision that a father was protected from
a contempt citation for refusing on religious grounds to make child
support payments. 1 '
More typical were the City of Chicago's
experiences under the federal RFRA, which included claims for
exemption from the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, 12 the Chicago
Zoning Code, 13 and the City's uniform employment policies for
police.14

6. See id. at 878.
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1995).
10. See United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225, 1230 (D.N.M. 1997).
11. See Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 853 (Vt. 1994).
12. See Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 751 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist.), vacated on ripeness grounds, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997). Jasniowski involved a landlord who claimed exemption from a marital status discrimination suit because renting to unmarried couples violated his
religious beliefs. See id. The court found a substantial burden but held that eradicating discrimination was a compelling state interest and that prohibiting every discriminatory act was the least
restrictive means of achieving the goal. See id.; cf. Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996). Smith involved the application of the Fair Employment
and Housing Act to a landlord with religious objections to cohabitation. See id. at 912. The court
held that this application did not violate RFRA, finding no substantial burden because it was possible to avoid a conflict by investing capital outside of the housing market. See id. at 925.
13. See C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, No. 94-C6151, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2230, 2233 (N.D.
I11.Feb. 26, 1996) (stating a RFRA claim where a zoning code bans churches from locating in
Manufacturing Districts and requires special use permits in Business and Commercial Districts),
rev'd sub nom. Iglesia De La Biblia Abierta v. Banks, 129 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 1997).
14. See Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C5371, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 533 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 12, 1996) (involving a RFRA claim based on a religious objection to occasional abortion
clinic protection duty and holding that compelling interest and least restrictive means are ques-
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Why RFRAs Don't Work

In 1997, the United States Supreme Court struck down the federal
RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,15 primarily on federalism grounds.
The Court held that Congress lacked the power under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 16 to change the meaning of the
First Amendment. 17 Although the Court also noted the federal RFRA's
separation of powers problem in dicta, its narrow holding gave impetus

to claims that the door was open for states to enact such legislation, and
they have done so.
The Illinois RFRA, which had the support of a broad spectrum of
religious and civil liberty groups, 18 arose out of a national movement to
19
enact state RFRAs. The Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion,

which earlier lobbied for the federal law, formed the State RFRA Task
Force to push for such laws in every state. 20 To date, Arizona, Florida,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas have enacted
state RFRAs, and bills have been introduced in many other state
legislatures. 21 Local government organizations opposed the Illinois
RFRA, fearing numerous exceptions to neutral laws and increased
litigation due to its unusual award of attorney's fees to successful
defendants. 22 Given that the Illinois RFRA is one of the first state

tions of fact), later proceeding, 975 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd, 156 F.3d 772 (7th Cir.
1998) (granting summary judgment for City under Title VII, reasoning that contractual right to
transfer to a district with no abortion clinic was reasonable accommodation).
15. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
17. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
18. See H.B. 2370, 90th Leg. Day 1 (Ill. 1998) (indicating the support of the Christian Coalition, the Concerned Christian Americans, the Family Institute, the Jewish Community Relations
Council, People for the American Way, and the American Civil Liberties Union).
19. See Current Members of the Coalition (last modified Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.religiousfreedom.org/coalition.html> (listing the 72 members of this umbrella organization as of July 10,
1997).
20. See Jeremy Learning, Restoration Drama: Downfall of FederalReligious Protection Law
Produces New Coalition Strategy (visited on Oct. 31, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/
religion/series/keeping.faith.2.asp> (discussing state coalition strategies after federal RFRA declared unconstitutional).
21. In the 1999 legislative session, 16 states had bills under consideration, including those
signed into law in Arizona, South Carolina, and Texas. See Chart of Church/State Issues (last
modified July 28, 1999) <http://www.Au.org/st-chart.htm>. In 1998, 23 states had RFRA bills
pending or in place. See Jeremy Learning, A Stampede of State Religious-Freedom Protection
Bills: What's Going On? (visited Oct. 31, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/
religion/series/keeping.faith. 1.asp> (discussing RFRA proponents' efforts to pass state RFRAs
after the federal RFRA was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court).
22. See Verla Gillmor, States Pass New Protectionsfor Religious Expression, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, January 11, 1999, at 20. See generally 1999 LEGISL. BULL. (Illinois Municipal League).
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RFRAs enacted in the aftermath of Boerne, the legal issues decided in
23
challenges to this law will have far-reaching implications.

There are two primary constitutional concerns raised by the state
RFRAs, including Illinois': (1) the separation of powers between the
24
judicial and the legislative branches; and (2) the Establishment Clause
and its state constitution counterparts. This Article focuses primarily on
Illinois law, but the core issues and analysis will be very similar in
challenges to other state RFRAs, as well as to the federal RFRA as
applied to federal law. 25 Although there has been a great deal of legal
commentary on the federal RFRA, 26 little of the discussion has involved
these issues. 27 Additionally, there has been almost no legal analysis of

23. Numerous cases certainly will be brought under the Illinois RFRA. See, e.g., R. Bruce
Dold, A Cross to Bear, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1998, at 29. Dold noted that days after the Illinois
RFRA's passage, the attorneys for Sprint argued its application before a zoning board, which had
called a hearing over a 120-foot-high cellular telephone tower, paid for by Sprint, and dressed up
as a cross. See id.; Steve Kloehn, Law Would Give Religions Free Reign, Towns Argue, CHI.
TRIB., July 4, 1998, at 12 (describing a church's desire to build a home for the elderly with a wing
for Alzheimer's patients in the middle of a residential neighborhood as a potential RFRA suit).
For the first case applying the Illinois RFRA, see infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text
(noting that ramifications of this case are uncertain, but the opinion could be useful to government attorneys). Although Connecticut and Rhode Island passed RFRAs in 1993 prior to the focus on state RFRAs that followed City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), those statutes
have been largely ignored and there are no published decisions.
24. The Establishment Clause, which is contained in the First Amendment, provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... " U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
25. Several courts have expressed some doubt about the constitutionality of the federal RFRA
as applied to federal laws. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Flores casts doubt on the continued
viability of the federal RFRA); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 849, 853 n.8 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (noting that the constitutionality of the RFRA as applied
to federal laws is "far from clear"). Courts, however, have applied the federal RFRA without
analysis because the federal government has agreed that RFRA applies to federal laws. See Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 175 n.1 (3d Cir, 1999); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 15, 24 n.6 (D.D.C. 1999). The one court to evaluate the RFRA in the federal context
upheld it against federal separation of powers and Establishment Clause challenges. See In re
Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
26. See generally The James R. Browning Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1995) (covering the constitutional implications of the RFRA
in multiple articles); Symposium: Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 597 (1998) (covering various aspects of the decision in multiple articles).
27. See infra notes 86, 180 (listing the relatively few articles addressing separation of powers
or the Establishment Clause in connection with the federal RFRA).
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the Illinois separation of powers clause or Illinois' equivalent of the
29
Free Exercise 28 and Establishment Clauses.
The separation of powers and the Establishment Clause concerns are
related in that they both arise because of a fundamental problem
inherent in all RFRAs, including Illinois': legislatures did not enact
them to solve any actual, recognized problem of discrimination or
burden on religious conduct. Thus, arguably, the RFRA's purpose was
to institute a global protection of religiously motivated conduct
whenever it conflicts with government regulation. Indeed, all the
RFRAs, including Illinois', are the product of legislative disagreement
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
The Illinois RFRA raises fascinating new issues at the heart of the
separation of powers doctrine. Under the guise of creating a new
statutory cause of action, the Illinois Legislature has unduly interfered
with the core judicial function of defining constitutional rights. Because
the statutory cause of action is identical to the constitutional one, the
Illinois RFRA's standard of review supplants, rather than supplements,
the constitutional standard of review, effectively preventing Illinois
courts from following Smith.
The Illinois RFRA also reveals the crux of the inherent tension
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause and,
correspondingly, between Illinois' constitutional prohibition of religious
preferences and protection of religious freedoms. 30 The statute, which
requires strict scrutiny for every law or policy that infringes on
religiously motivated conduct in order to protect the free exercise of
religion, violates the core nonestablishment principle that laws must not
favor religion over "irreligion." Under Establishment Clause principles,
laws making exceptions solely for religious conduct must be lifting a
specific burden placed on that religious conduct or else protection of
religious freedoms strays into preference. The Illinois RFRA, however,
is global in nature and fails to identify any such burden.
28. Like the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause is contained in the First Amendment and provides that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ....
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are sometimes
referred to as the Religion Clauses.
29. See Michael P. Seng, Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, and Freedom of Religion
under the Illinois Constitution, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 91, 93 (1989) (noting the dearth of state constitutional commentary and analyzing legislative history of the religious freedom provision).
30. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (providing the text of Illinois' freedom of religion clause). As one commentator pointed out: "the Religion Clauses 'are cast in absolute
terms, and either... if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."' Jesse
H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT.
L. REV. 673, 673 (1990) (quoting Walz v. Comnmissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
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Moreover, the Establishment Clause issue and the separation of
powers problem coalesce in the Illinois RFRA. Because judges
consider the constitutional ban on religious preferences when deciding
between free exercise rights and general laws, changing the standard of
review by statute does more than enhance an important free exercise
right; it disturbs the judicial balancing of the two religion clauses.
This Article first sets forth the provisions of the Illinois RFRA, and
then further explains the Supreme Court cases referred to in the Illinois
statute. 31 Next, it addresses the issue of whether the Illinois RFRA
violates the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers clause. 32 This
section also provides the foundation for an explanation of current
Illinois free exercise law, which the statute fails to recognize.3 3 Next,
this Article explores how the Illinois RFRA also violates
34
nonestablishment principles of both the federal and state constitutions.
Finally, the Article discusses whether the Illinois RFRA could be
redrafted and concludes that only a more tailored statute would be
35
constitutional.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Illinois RFRA

The central provision of the Illinois RFRA reads:
Free exercise of religion protected. Government may not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (ii) is the least 36
restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
The statute broadly defines "exercise of religion" as "an act or refusal to
act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the
religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of
37
religious belief."
The stated purpose of the Illinois RFRA is "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner"

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part M.A.
See infra Part IlI.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (West Supp. 1999).

37. Id. § 35/5.
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and to provide a private right of action and a statutory defense to
government enforcement actions.3 8 The legislative findings, which in
large part parrot those of the invalidated federal RFRA, begin by stating
that the free exercise of religion is a fundamental right secured by
Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution. 39 The Illinois
Legislature then notes its dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's
holding in Smith by stating: "[i]n Employment Division v. Smith, the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution that government justify
burdens on the exercise of religion imposed by laws neutral toward
religion." 40 Finally, the Illinois Legislature expresses a preference for
the compelling interest test of Yoder and Sherbert for all free exercise
4
claims. 1
The Illinois Legislature attempts to lay the groundwork for the
constitutionality of the Illinois RFRA in its characterization of the
Boerne Court's rationale for striking down the federal RFRA.
Specifically, it notes: "[iln City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, the Supreme
Court held that an Act passed by Congress to address the matter of
burdens placed on the exercise of religion infringed on the legislative
powers reserved to the states under the Constitution of the United
States. 4 2 The Illinois RFRA later states that it should not be construed
to affect governmental funding of religious institutions or
43
interpretations of the federal or state establishment clause provisions.
The statute also preempts home rule powers, thereby restricting units of
local government from legislating differently on this issue. 44
The statute next creates a separate statutory cause of action by
providing that a violation of its standard may be asserted as a claim or
defense.4 5 Parties who prevail against the government are entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in maintaining their claim or
defense. 46 This award of attorneys' fees puts the government in the

38. Id. § 35/10(b)(l)-(2) (citation omitted).
39. See id. § 35/10(a)(1); see also infra Part 1l1.B (discussing Art. I, Section 3 of the Illinois

Constitution, which contains Illinois' equivalent of the Free Exercise Clause).
40. Id. § 35/10(a)(4) (citation omitted).
41. See id. § 35/10(a)(6).
42. Id. § 35/10(a)(5) (citation omitted).
43. See id. § 35/25(c).
44. See id. § 35/25(d).

45. See id.
§ 35/20.
46.

See id.

160
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for merely prosecuting
unusual position of risking large fee expenses
47
violations of the law in a neutral manner.
The scant legislative history available includes the remarks of the
Illinois RFRA's sponsors, Representative Gash and Senator Parker.
Their remarks emphasize two points. First, the scope of the Illinois
RFRA is vast: it applies the same standard of review for religious
claims to every area of state and local law. Second, its purpose is to
restore the judicial
standard of review that until recently, has been used
48
for decades.
B.

Supreme Court Cases Referred to in the Illinois RFRA

A brief discussion of the Supreme Court cases referred to in the
Illinois RFRA provides important background information and is also
useful to illustrate two points. First, the RFRA test, which requires the
government to prove a compelling interest and the least restrictive
means each time a neutral law affects religiously-motivated conduct,
does not reflect the pre-Smith case law as suggested by the Illinois
Legislature. Although Smith represents a significant change in the
47. There do not appear to be any other federal or Illinois statutes awarding fees to those who
successfully defend against a valid government prosecution. Those statutes that provide that
courts may award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties do so where a party has brought a proceeding against the government to enforce the statutory right. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1999); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1-11 (West 1998) (Illinois Freedom of Information Act).
48. See H.B. 2370, 90th Leg., Day 20-21, 26 (II. 1998) (Remarks of Sen. Parker). Senator
Parker stated:
[N]o area of law-including public health and safety, civil rights, education, and any
others-is exempt from the standard that RFA [sic] establishes. Again, no Statute necessarily constitutes a compelling governmental interest. As Section 10(b)(l) states,
RFA [sic] simply restores a standard of review to be applied to all State and local laws
and ordinances in all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened... I want to stress, because there have been several questions: Remember that,
up until recently, State and local governments have had to follow the same standards of
RFA [sic] as we are proposing here. This has been done for decades. If State or local
governments had a problem, we would have heard about these problems.
Id. Similarly, Senator Gash noted:
[No area of law, including public health and safety, civil rights, zoning, education,
employment, housing, public accommodations, and any others is exempt from this
standard which RFRA establishes. Again, no statute necessarily constitutes a compelling government interest. As Section 10(b)(1) states, 'RFRA simply restores a standard
of review to be applied to all,' and I emphasize 'all,' 'state and local laws and ordinances. In all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.'
H.B. 2370, 90th Leg., Day 1 (Il1. 1998) (Remarks of Sen. Gash during debate on Senate Amendment I to House Bill 2370, which changed the effective date). Generally, there are no transcriptions of committee hearings for Illinois statutes. Thus, the only legislative intent available for the
Illinois RFRA comes from the brief floor debates of the House and Senate and the findings set
forth in the bill itself.
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Court's approach to the Free Exercise Clause, the Illinois RFRA is
much stricter than the context-dependent balancing test previously used.
Second, the analysis in City of Boerne v. Flores undermines, rather than
supports, the constitutionality of the Illinois RFRA.
First, a discussion of Wisconsin v. Yoder helps to show that the
Illinois RFRA does not reflect pre-Smith case law. Yoder, which the
Illinois RFRA purports to restore, is regarded as the high water mark for
protection of free exercise rights, but even this decision is narrowly
drawn. In Yoder, the Supreme Court used a balancing process and held
that the First Amendment prevented the state from compelling Amish
parents to send their children to formal high school. 49 The Court
weighed the Amish claim that this requirement severely undercut their
300-year-old community by exposing their children to a worldly
environment at a critical developmental stage against the state's general
interest in compulsory education, which include preparing children to
become economically self sufficient and good citizens. 50 Ultimately,
the Court determined that the state's interests were weak in this
application. 5 1 Although the majority used expansive language similar to
the Illinois RFRA test, 52 the decision was carefully limited to the facts
and relied heavily on the centrality of the Amish tradition of home
schooling to the long-established Amish religion. 53 The Illinois
RFRA's strict scrutiny standard does not permit this consideration and,
thus, goes beyond Yoder.
Sherbert v. Verner also reveals that the standard set forth in the
Illinois RFRA does not reflect the pre-Smith standard. Like Yoder,
Sherbert, the other decision that the Illinois Legislature seeks to restore,
was also much narrower in scope than some of its expansive language
suggests. Sherbert involved a member of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church who was fired by her employer because she would not work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. 54 The state then denied her
application for unemployment compensation, because she had failed to
accept suitable work without "good cause." 55 The Supreme Court held
that this denial violated the Free Exercise Clause, because the state
conducted an individualized evaluation of the claimant's reasons for

49.
50.
51.
5253.
54.
55.

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
See id. at 213-28.
See id. at 210-11,219-20.
See id.at 215-16.
See id. at 219, 235.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
See id. at 399-401.
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unemployment and failed to respect the observance of a minority
religion's Saturday Sabbath. 56 Also, although Sherbert contained
language similar to the Illinois RFRA's strict scrutiny standard, it did

not actually use a least restrictive means test.
As Yoder and Sherbert demonstrate, the Supreme Court's pre-Smith
approach to free exercise is best described as "context-dependent
balancing," in which the standard of review is calibrated to the factual
setting. 57 Indeed, prior to Smith, the Court never really imposed a "least
restrictive means" requirement.5 8 For example, in the areas of prisons,5 9
the military, 6° and administrative requirements of government welfare
programs, 6 1 the Court has held that the compelling interest test does not
56. See id. at 410. Moreover, the Court found that other South Carolina laws protected the
mainstream Sabbath and found no evidence supporting the State's asserted interest in avoiding
deceit and malingering. See id. at 406. Note that the court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah held that, even after Smith, where a facially neutral statute is enacted to target
the activities of a religion, the law is subject to strict scrutiny. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). In
Church of Lukumi BabaluAye, the Court struck down an ordinance designed to suppress the central element of the Santeria worship service, animal sacrifice. See id. at 524.
57. See Marci A. Hamilton, Does Religious Freedom Have a Future? The FirstAmendment
After Boerne, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 33, 39 (1997).
58. See id. (discussing the pre-Smith practice by courts of "context-dependent balancing").
Commentators appear to agree that the Court has never strictly applied the "compelling interest/least restrictive means" test to religious claims. Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress
Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1,
5-12 (1994) (examining half-hearted application of the compelling interest test in pre-Smith
cases); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 447 (1994) (finding that use of the compelling
interest test was "strict in theory but feeble in fact" in pre-Smith religious exemption cases, and,
outside of Sherbert and Yoder, the test proclaimed dead in Smith had never really lived); Eugene
Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 65, 84-86 (1996) (finding that prior to Smith, military and prison regulations received special
deference, but otherwise the Court was balancing the government interest against the burden imposed); see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 153, 158 (1997) (asserting that pre-Smith, the "freedomprotective"-versus nondiscriminatory-interpretation was firmly entrenched, but "haphazardly
enforced"); cf Ira C. Lupu, The Failureof RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 602 (1998)
(concluding that courts also had applied the federal RFRA strict scrutiny test in an inconsistent
manner).
59. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (reviewing prison regulations
under a reasonableness test and upholding restrictions on Islamic inmates attending Friday religious services).
60. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986). In Goldman, the Court stated
that the military need not accommodate religious practices, and upheld an Air Force dress code
that penalized wearing a yarmulke. See id. at 509-10.
61. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1986). The Bowen Court rejected the Yoder test
for neutral regulations on "internal affairs" of government bureaucracy and used a reasonableness
test to uphold a regulation requiring welfare recipients to have a social security number as against
a Native American's claim that the rule robbed his child's spirit. See id. at 707; see also Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (rejecting the com-
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apply. Accordingly, the Illinois Legislature's contention that the Illinois
RFRA's strict scrutiny test simply restores the pre-Smith standard is
incorrect.
A brief discussion of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, which the Illinois RFRA was enacted to address,
provides important background. In Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, took the position that throughout the history of the Court's free
exercise decisions, general, neutral law has always been able to
unintentionally burden religious conduct without violating the First
Amendment.6 2 He reasoned that this is so because "[t]he government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector's spiritual development."' 63 Further, to do so would
allow every individual "by virtue of his beliefs" to become a law unto
himself.64
According to Justice Scalia, the only decisions where the First
Amendment has barred application of a nondiscriminatory law to
religiously motivated conduct have involved either: (1) additional
protections, or "hybrid rights," such as the parental rights in Wisconsin
v. Yoder; 65 or (2) unemployment compensation cases, 66 where the
government is already doing individualized assessments of the reasons
for the relevant conduct, as in Sherbert v. Verner.67 Finally, the Smith
Court rejected using the "centrality" of the religious practice as a limit

pelling interest test for claim that government decision to build road on land sacred to Native
Americans violated First Amendment because the government policy did not coerce anyone into
acting in violation of their religious beliefs). As a practical matter, these decisions open up an
alternative argument for RFRA defendants: namely, that where there is a Supreme Court decision
on point, which does not use the compelling interest test, litigants may assert that, because the
RFRA purports to restore pre-Smith free exercise law, those cases should be followed.
62. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
63. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451).
64. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (rejecting free exercise defense to criminal polygamy law)).
65. See id. at 881-82 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20).
66. See id. at 883 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
67. See id. at 884 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410). But see id. at 899 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (criticizing sharply the majority's methodology of looking at outcomes to define the Court's
free exercise approach). In Justice O'Connor's view, "the First Amendment at least requires a
case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

on governmental actions 68 and found the legislature better suited to
weigh the social value of laws against the importance of religious

practices.

69

Finally, a brief discussion of City of Boerne v. Flores, the case that
struck down the federal RFRA, provides important background
information and also demonstrates the Illinois Legislature's error in
stating that Boerne supports the Illinois RFRA's constitutionality.
Indeed, despite the Illinois Legislature's interpretation of Boerne as
70
holding that religious freedom legislation is reserved to the states,
Boerne strongly supports the proposition that any RFRA violates the
separation of powers doctrine. Boerne involved a local government's
denial of a building permit to enlarge a church, based on an historic
preservation district ordinance. 71 The Catholic Archbishop sued under
the federal RFRA and challenged the constitutionality of the
ordinance.7 2 Starting from the basic Constitutional premise that the
federal government is one of enumerated powers, the Court's opinion
primarily evaluated Congress' reliance on its Enforcement Clause
Amendment and held that Congress
powers to enforce the Fourteenth
73
had exceeded that power.
The underlying premise of Boerne is that the Constitution is what the
Supreme Court says it is.74 Accordingly, legislating a standard different
from the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is, in effect,
an attempt to change the Constitution. Although the Boerne Court used
this principle to show that Congress had legislated beyond its section 5
68. See id. at 886-87.
69. See id. at 890. My own view, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is that there must
be some circumstances under which religious claimants, especially those with minority practices,
can obtain judicial relief from unintentionally burdensome laws. In fact, the situation in Smith,
where a criminal law was imposed on persons engaged in the central element of their Native
American worship service, seems especially suited to application of the compelling interest/least
restrictive means test. See id. at 874.
70. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(5) (West Supp. 1999); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Legislature's characterization of the Boerne rationale).
71. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 532-36 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5). The Court held that the
RFRA attempted to change the substantive law set out in Smith, rather than enforce it, on several
grounds. See id. at 530-34. First, the legislative record lacked any modem examples of generally
applicable laws passed due to religious prejudice. See id. at 530. Second, the RFRA's sweeping
coverage meant that many laws valid under Smith would fail, even though they did not target free
exercise. See id. at 534. Third, RFRA's stringent test goes far beyond the disparate impact test
that sometimes is used to infer discriminatory intent. See id. at 533. Fourth, the Act imposed a
"least restrictive means" test, which was not even used in the pre-Smith cases it sought to codify.
See id. at 534.
74. See id. at 535-56.
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enforcement power, 75 this principle is also useful in portraying how the
Illinois RFRA violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Specifically, the Boerne conclusion, while admittedly slipping into
dicta, focused almost entirely on the importance of preserving the
proper separation of powers as between the legislature and the court.
Indeed, the Court stated:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of government respects both the Constitution and the
proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law
is. Marbury v. Madison. When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of
the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later
cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.76
The opinion concluded: "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary
to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance." 77 Therefore,
contrary to the Illinois RFRA's premise, nothing in City of Boerne v.
Flores suggests that Congress was infringing on "legislative powers
reserved to the states," 78 nor does it encourage state legislatures to take
over judicial interpretation.
III.

ILLINOIS' RFRA VIOLATES THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION'S

SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE

A.

The Separation of Powers Problem

From one vantage point, the Illinois RFRA is a legislative attempt to
transfer the power to interpret the Illinois Constitution's Religious
Freedom Clause from the judiciary, where it normally resides, to the
legislature. The statute's focus on restoring a prior judicial standard,
without creating any new prohibitions on government conduct, suggests
that it is discussing the proper treatment of a previously-existing
79
constitutional claim.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 536.
Id. at 535-36 (citation omitted).
Id.
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(5).
See id. § 35/10(b)(1).
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The above conclusion is the most straightforward reading of the
legislative findings and purpose sections of the Illinois RFRA. The
findings begin by stating that the free exercise of religion is a
fundamental right secured by Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution, 80 then opines that Smith undermined free exercise 8 1 and
that the compelling interest test, set forth in other decisions, is a better
standard of review for free exercise claims.8 2 There are no findings
regarding any burdens that existing law has placed on any particular
83
religious group or practice.
This conclusion is buttressed by the comments of RFRA's legislative
sponsors, particularly Senator Parker, who stated:
RFRA simply restores a standard of review to be applied to all State
and local laws and ordinances in all cases in which the free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened. [U]p until recently, State and local
RFA (sic) as
governments have had to follow the same standards of
84
we are proposing here. This has been done for decades.
The Illinois RFRA merely stamps a legislative interpretation onto the
previously existing constitutional claim. Even though the statute
purports to create a new statutory cause of action, its superficial use of
the phrase "provides a claim or defense" 85 cannot transform the
underlying realities. The triggers for a claim under Article I, Section 3
of the Illinois Constitution, Illinois' Free Exercise Clause, and a claim
under the Illinois RFRA are identical: any time a person's religiously
motivated conduct is substantially burdened by a government law,
policy or action. Neither the text nor the legislative history make any
distinctions between the types of cases or facts that are covered by the
statute versus those covered by the Illinois Constitution.
Thus, the statute is either: (1) purposely telling the courts how they
must interpret Article I, Section 3 free exercise claims; or (2) creating a
statutory cause of action that is identical to that under Article I, Section
3. Under either interpretation, the Illinois RFRA mandates the preferred
legislative standard of review for all claims that assert that the
government has burdened religious conduct. As several federal courts
and commentators recognized with the federal RFRA, any distinction
between requiring the "compelling interest/least restrictive means" test
80. See id. § 35/10(a)(1).
81.

See id. § 35/10(a)(4).

82. See id. § 35/10(a)(6).
83. See id. § 35/10(a)(5), 25(c), 25(d).
1998) (providing the transcript of the Senate De84. H.B. 2370, 90th Leg., Day 20-21 (111.

bates from May 1998 concerning the Illinois RFRA).
85. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(b)(2).
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under a constitution or applying it under a RFRA is "functionally
86

meaningless."
RFRA supporters assert that legislatures are free to protect rights
beyond those deemed covered by the Constitution, relying on examples
such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.87 A better analogy, however, is if, following Craig v.
Boren,88 which settled on intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 89 Congress had passed a law
stating that this level of protection was insufficient and that judges must
apply strict scrutiny in all cases where the government classifies persons
according to sex, as in equal protection sex discrimination claims.
Although the legislature certainly may extend protections to unprotected
factual situations, it is far less certain whether the legislature may
simply alter the judiciary's standard of review for a previously existing
constitutional claim without a separation of powers violation.

86. Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 600 (D. Md. 1996)
(concluding that the federal RFRA was a violation of the separation of powers); see also Joanne
C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implicationsfor RFRA and Separation of
Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995) (arguing that forcing the Supreme Court to make decisions it
has determined are outside its judicial competence violates separation of powers); Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 58, at 443 (noting that the RFRA attempts to subvert, rather than supplement,
the Court's constitutional judgement); Gressman & Carmella, supra note 58, at 105 (stating that
the RFRA is a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,Period, 1 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 1, 2-8 (1998) (arguing that the federal RFRA is unconstitutional as it applies to either federal or state law). But see
Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that RFRA does not infringe on
separation of powers), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (remanding for further consideration in
light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Thomas C. Berg, The ConstitutionalFuture of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 715 (1998) (arguing that
the RFRA creates a separate statutory right); Stephen Gardbaum, The FederalismImplications of
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 670 (1998) (stating that the Constitution allows states to
augment minimum federal regulations of free exercise).
87. See, e.g., In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing that Congress often
provides protection for liberties that exceed the Court's idea of minimum constitutional protection), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 43 (1998); Berg, supra note 86, at 739-42. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), which held that an insurance
plan for California employees that did not cover pregnancy, did not discriminate on the basis of
sex, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994),
which included pregnancy within Title VII's prohibitions on discrimination. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000(n)(6) (1994), which includes Title VII, also created new
protections. See id. at 742-43. The Act addressed the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to protect against discriminatory
conduct beyond state action. See id.
88. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
89. See id. at 197 (striking down statute prohibiting beer sales to males under 21 and females
under 18, using the "substantially related to important governmental objectives" test).
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Turning to the Illinois law of separation of powers, the case for a
violation may be more compelling under Illinois law than it is under
federal law, because the separation of powers doctrine is grounded not
only in the three-part structure of government, but is stated in an express
provision in the Illinois Constitution. Specifically, Article II, Section 1
provides: "[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are 9separate.
No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
Not surprisingly then, no Illinois precedent exists where the
legislature has intentionally sought to fashion its own standard of
review for a fundamental constitutional right. Three lines of cases,
however, suggest that Illinois' Separation of Powers Clause is violated
by the Illinois RFRA. First, a line of property tax cases establishes that
the Illinois Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Illinois
Constitution and that the legislature cannot change a judicial
interpretation of a clause by passing a statute that ascribes a different
meaning to it. Importantly, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted
Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution, Illinois' Religious
Freedom Clause, as prohibiting any exceptions to general laws when
burden persons engaged in religiously motivated
they incidentally
91
conduct.
Second, Illinois separation of powers cases show that the legislature
cannot change a judicial interpretation of a law without first changing
the law. 92 Arguably, the Illinois RFRA tries to change the judicial
interpretation of the Illinois Constitution. As such, the legislature
should be required to follow the procedures necessary to amend the
Constitution. A third line of separation of powers cases shows that the
Illinois Supreme Court has consistently struck down statutes that
infringe too greatly on an essential judicial function and that
constitutional interpretation has long been recognized as the court's
primary role. Because the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet
determined whether it will follow Smith, the Illinois RFRA may be
viewed as taking over the judicial prerogative to determine the free
exercise standard. The following sections address these three lines of
cases in detail.

90. ILL. CONST. art. n, § 1.
91. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing Department of Mental Health v.
Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d 4 (111. 1967)).
92. See infra Part III.A.2 (setting forth a line of cases prohibiting retroactive application of a

statute to overrule a judicial decision).
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1. A Statute Cannot Alter a Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution
A line of Illinois Supreme Court cases involving the property tax
provisions of the Illinois Constitution demonstrates that it is primarily
the role of the courts, not the legislature, to interpret and apply
constitutional provisions. Statutes that attempt to interpret provisions
of
93
the Illinois Constitution cannot override judicial interpretations.
94
The opinion in Chicago Bar Association v. Department of Revenue
("CBA") is illustrative.
In CBA, the Chicago Bar Association
constructed a new building adjacent to the John Marshall Law School
and requested tax relief based on the Illinois Revenue Act's statutory
exemption for school property. 95 The Illinois Revenue Act had defined
school property as property "'adjacent to... the grounds of a school
which property is used by ...[a] professional society ...which serves
the advancement of learning in a field or fields of study taught by the
school and which property is not used with a view to profit."' 96
Despite the Illinois Revenue Act's definition of school property, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Chicago Bar Association could not
take advantage of the school property exemption. The court pointed out
that the Illinois Constitution permits tax exemption for school property
97
only when it is used "'exclusively for. . . school ... purposes.'
Courts have interpreted this to mean the exemption98 is available only
where property is used primarily for a school purpose.
Because the CBA headquarters served primarily as a place where
members of a professional organization could meet and dine, the court
held that it did not meet the constitutional standard as judicially
interpreted, despite the applicable legislation. 99 In so deciding, the
Illinois Supreme Court made clear that: (1) the constitution means what
the courts say it means; and (2) the legislature has no power to change
judicial interpretations of the constitution by statute. 100

93. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 1166, 1171 (11. 1994);
McKenzie v. Johnson, 456 N.E.2d 73, 76 (I11.
1983); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of
the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 237 N.E.2d 533, 538 (I11.
1968); MacMurray College v.
Wright, 230 N.E.2d 846, 849 (111.1967).
94. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 1166 (I11.
1994).
95. See id. at 1168.
96. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., 1991, ch. 120, par. 500.1 (1991)). The current version of
this statute is codified at 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/15-35(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
97. Id. at 1168 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6).
98. See id. at ll71.
99. See id.at 1171-72.
100. See id. at 1171. The court stated:
Whether particular property is used 'exclusively for... school ... purposes' within the
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The court did not strike down the Illinois Revenue Act or rely on the
Separation of Powers Clause, however, because there was no evidence
that the legislature had acted to override a judicial interpretation.
Indeed, the definition of property in the Illinois Revenue Act could be
viewed as one example of the types of properties that may meet the

constitutional tax exemption. 10 1 Also, the Illinois Legislature may have

enacted the tax statute to implement the constitutional standard for the
tax exemption, because the relevant constitutional section is not self-

executing. 102
With the Illinois RFRA, however, the legislature is not entitled to any
presumption of constitutional intent, because the statute itself admits
that its purpose is to change the current judicial interpretation of free
exercise. In addition, the Bill of Rights is self-executing and, thus, a
statute purporting to implement its protections should be inherently
suspect.10 3 One appellate court clearly stated that because of the
separation of powers, the legislature lacks the power to alter a
"constitutional right ...that flows from judicial interpretation of the
constitution." 104 Thus, as opposed to these property tax statutes, it is
meaning of the constitution is a matter for the courts, and not the legislature, to ascertain. The legislature cannot, by its enactment, make that a school purpose which is not
in fact a school purpose.
Each individual claim must be determined from the facts presented.
Id. (citations omitted).
Similarly, in People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of Winnebago Home for the Aged, 237
N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 1968), despite a nursing home's conformity with the statutory test for tax exemption, the court held that "it must also comply unequivocally with the constitutional requirement of exclusively charitable use. The determinationof compliance or noncompliance is a judicial function which may not be usurped by the legislature." Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
Because the nursing home charged a sizeable admission fee and imposed certain entrance requirements, it was not inclusive enough to meet the judicial interpretation of the "exclusively
charitable" constitutional exemption. See id. at 539-40; see also People v. Gaulano, 240 N.E.2d
467, 470 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1968) (stating that where the constitution barred persons convicted of "infamous crimes" from state office, a statute cataloging "infamous crimes" was "not
controlling, for the legislature ... legislated beyond the boundaries of its authority into an area
which is subject to judicial interpretation").
101. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 644 N.E.2d at 1169-71.
102. See id. at 1172 (discussing ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6); see also MacMurray College v.
Wright, 230 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ill.
1967)).
103. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-24 (1997). The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the Bill of Rights to the States, "set forth self-executing
prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those
provisions." Id. at 524.
104. People v. Gallegos, 689 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1997). In Gallegos, a
criminal defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute that eliminated the "substantive"
rule of venue. See id. Prior to this, the statute required the state to prove the location of the offense as an element of the crime. See id. at 224. The court found that this rule was an independent obligation placed upon the state by the common law; it was not derived from the constitu-
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more likely that a court would strike down the Illinois RFRA as a

violation of the Separation of Powers Clause.
2. The Legislature Can Only Overrule a Judicial Decision by
Prospectively Amending the Law Interpreted by the Court
Second, a series of cases involving attempted retroactive application
of an amended statute sheds light on the separation of powers issues
presented by the Illinois RFRA. 10 5 In each of these cases, legislators
responded to a court decision that interpreted a statute, declaring that
the amendment was a clarification of the original intent of the statute.
In amending the respective statute, the legislators also provided for the
retroactive application of the "corrected" statutory provision. The
Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this practice violates the
Separation of Powers Clause, because it effectively overrules a judicial

interpretation.
This line of cases has an indirect, but significant, application to the
Illinois RFRA. Specifically, these cases hold that the Illinois
Legislature cannot pass a statute that overrules the manner in which the
Illinois courts have interpreted a law. Instead, if the legislature
disagrees with the judicial interpretation of a law, it can change that law
prospectively. The amended law will become the basis for subsequent
judicial interpretations. 106 Arguably, in the case of the Illinois RFRA,
the law that the legislature thinks the courts have misinterpreted, and

tional right to a speedy trial by a jury from the county where the crime occurred. See id. at 225
(discussing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8). Thus, changing the substantive rule of venue by statute did
not violate the separation of powers. See id. at 226. In contrast, the court pointed out that the
legislature could not, without violating the separation of powers, have altered the "procedural"
aspect of venue, which by judicial interpretation of the constitutional right allows objections to
improper venue at the start of the trial. See id. Although taking away an individual's constitutional right is clearly more problematic than granting individuals additional protection against
government, Gallegos did not make that distinction, but spoke to the broader separation of powers limits on legislative action. See id.
105. See Hamilton County Tel. Coop. v. Maloney, 601 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Il. 1992) (refusing
to apply an amendment to the Illinois Human Rights Act made in response to an adverse judicial
decision); Bates v. Board of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 3 (111. 1990) (holding that a legislative clarification regarding a section of the School Code violated the separation of powers); In re Marriage
of Cohn, 443 N.E.2d 541, 547 (Ill. 1982) (finding that the legislature invaded the province of the
judiciary by retroactively overruling a court decision concerning a divorce statute prospectively);
Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ill. 1979) (overruling the legislature's attempt to retroactively amend the Cannabis Control Act to make costs a reasonable term of probation following a
contrary court decision).
106. See Bates, 555 N.E.2d at 4. The Bates court stated: "[w]hile the General Assembly can
pass legislation to prospectively change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the
judicial interpretation was at odds with legislative intent, it cannot effect a change in that construction by a later declaration of what it had originally intended." Id. (citations omitted).
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which the statute seeks to correct, is not a statute but the constitutional
free exercise provision.
If one views the Illinois RFRA as legislation designed to change a
judicial interpretation of Article I, Section 3, Illinois' Free Exercise
Clause, it can only be done by following the proper procedures for
constitutional amendment. 1°7 Amendments require a three-fifths
approval by each house and submission to the public for a vote with
approval by either three-fifths of those voting on the question or a
majority of those voting in the election. 10 8 Thus, because the
procedures for constitutional amendment were not followed, the statute
cannot successfully change the judicial test for Illinois religious
09
freedom claims.'
3. Laws Invading the Province of the Judiciary are Unconstitutional
Under the Separation of Powers Clause
In numerous decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has struck down
statutes that violate the Separation of Powers Clause, because they
invade the province of the judiciary. As the court recently stated in Best
v. Taylor Machine Works: 110 "[iln furtherance of the authority of the
judiciary to carry out its constitutional obligations, the legislature is
prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe upon the inherent
powers of judges." II l In Best, the court found the Civil Justice Reform
Amendments of 1995 unconstitutional." 2 Specifically, the court
determined that two elements in the amendments, the cap on
noneconomic compensatory damages' 13 and the requirement for
mandatory disclosure of plaintiffs' medical records 114 violated the
Separation of Powers Clause.

107. See ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (defining the procedure for the Illinois General Assembly
to amend the Illinois Constitution).
108. See id. The only other valid mechanisms for changing the Illinois Constitution are set
out elsewhere in Article XIV. Specifically, section 1 provides the mechanism for calling a Constitutional Convention for a more comprehensive review, and section 3 provides the procedures
for amendments to the Legislative Article. See ILL. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 3. In addition, section
4 sets out procedures for requests to amend the United States Constitution. See ILL. CONST. art.

XIV, § 4.
109. Moreover, if the Illinois RFRA were otherwise constitutional, its attempted retroactive
application clearly violates the separation of powers.
110. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (I11.
1997).
111. Id. at 1079.
112. See id. at 1064.
113. See id. at 1066-81.
114. See id. at 1089-1100.
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The Illinois Supreme Court's approach in. Best and related cases
demonstrates the problem with the Illinois RFRA. The Best court
looked first to the nature of the judicial power affected by the statute
and next to the degree of legislative interference. Specifically, the court
first established that for over a century, the doctrine of remittitur 115 has
been a traditional and inherent power of the judiciary. 116 Second, the
court stated that the statutory cap unduly undercut this "fundamentally
judicial prerogative" by making mandatory what should be done on a
case-by-case basis by a judge who carefully examines all of the
17
evidence. 1
Since the early days of Marbury v. Madison, 118 there has been no
more well-established and traditional right of the judiciary than its role
as the primary and final authority on matters of constitutional
interpretation. 1 9 Moreover, the property tax cases make clear that
where a judicial interpretation of the Constitution comes up against a
legislative one, the judicial view always prevails. 120 In fact, the judicial
interpretation is deemed equivalent to the Constitutional provision itself.
There can be no greater intrusion into this fundamental judicial
prerogative than that presented by the Illinois RFRA, which effectively
tells the court to stop using one interpretation of a constitutional right
and to substitute it with the legislative interpretation. Numerous courts
have held that the legislature has no power to tell the judiciary how to
interpret a law. For instance, discussing the Separation of Powers
Clause in People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 12 1 the Illinois Supreme
115. Remittitur is the ability to correct excessive jury verdicts. See BLACK'S LA W
DICTIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
116. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079.
117. See id. at 1080. Similarly, with respect to the statute's discovery provision, it restricted
courts from assessing the relevance of discovery requests and, thus, unduly interfered with the
exercise of inherent judicial powers to regulate the process of litigation. See id. at 1093; see also
Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1365 (Iil. 1997) (holding that the legislature "may not require judges to exercise their discretionary authority to punish for contempt, or tell the judiciary
the manner in which it will exercise such power" (citations omitted)); In re C.R.H., 644 N.E.2d
1153, 1158-59 (Ill. 1994) (holding that a statute that interfered with judges' common law ability
to override waivers of notice in the interest of justice violated separation of powers).
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
119. See Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 487 (N.D. I11. 1994) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)); see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (4th ed. 1991); Larry Alexander
& Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359
(1997). But see Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 849 (1998) (questioning rationales for judicial supremacy); Mark Tushnet, Two
Versions of JudicialSupremacy, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 945 (1998).
120. See supra Part [Ml.A. I (discussing property tax cases).
121. People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648 (111.1972).
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Court declared: "[t]he judicial power is vested solely in the courts, and

the legislative branch is without power to specify how the judicial
power shall be exercised under a given circumstance; it is without
authority to state explicitly how the judiciary shall construe a

statute."

122

In CrawfordDistributing, the court took issue with a provision of the
Illinois Antitrust Act, which stated that where the language was similar

to a federal antitrust law, "'the courts of this state in construing this Act
shall follow the construction given to the Federal Law by the Federal
Courts."' 123 Ultimately, the court looked to the federal case law for
useful guidance, but not as a result of the Illinois Antitrust Act's
directive. Rather, the court relied on Illinois cases stating that federal
law can be helpful when there is a dearth of Illinois precedent.' 24 In the
case of the Illinois RFRA, however, there can be no saving the statute;
rather than being a minor provision attached to a substantive law, the
legislature's directive to the courts on the proper interpretation of the
constitutional free exercise right is the entirety of the statute.
B.

The Free Exercise of Religion Under the Illinois Constitution

The Illinois RFRA's separation of powers problem can only be fully
demonstrated by considering the above cases in conjunction with the
Free Exercise Clause of the Illinois Constitution and existing Illinois
Free Exercise precedent. The text of the Illinois Constitution's
provision protecting the free exercise of religion is quite different from
that of the familiar First Amendment provision. 125 Entitled "Religious
Freedom," the provision states:

122. Id. at 652.
123. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 60-77 (1969)). The current version of this
statute is codified in 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/11 (West 1993). The language of the current statute is substantially the same.
124. See Crawford Distrib., 291 N.E.2d at 652 (citations omitted); see also People v. Barrett,
26 N.E.2d 478, 480 (111.1940) (noting that where the text of the Motor Fuel Tax Act asserted that
notes thereunder did "'not constitute an indebtedness of the state... within any constitutional
limitation' [i]t
is sufficient to say that such a provision ...is without effect, as the question of
whether they do constitute an indebtedness contrary to constitutional limitation is judicial and not
a legislative matter"); Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust, 361 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1977) ("Although the legislature is without authority to state explicitly how the judiciary
shall construe a statute, federal authorities will be consulted where there is a lack of Illinois
precedent."), aff'd, 380 N.E.2d 790 (111. 1978); cf.Palella v. Leyden Family Serv. & Mental
Health Ctr., 404 N.E.2d 228, 231 (Ill. 1980) (holding that "[a] legislative body ...is without
power to say how the judiciary shall construe a legislative enactment").
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."Id.
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The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person
shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on
account of his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations,
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required to attend or
support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall
any preference
be given by law to any religious denomination or mode
26
of worship. 1
Although Illinois free exercise jurisprudence is somewhat difficult to
characterize because it involves a melange of First Amendment, state
constitutional, mixed, and generic claims, it seems to mirror the Smith
Court's characterization of free exercise jurisprudence. Namely, this
jurisprudence provides that religious objections have not entitled
claimants to exemption from neutral laws except where there are
individualized determinations or hybrid claims. 127 Illinois courts,
however, are not limited to following United States Supreme Court
precedent in a lockstep fashion when interpreting the Illinois Bill of
Rights; indeed, both the text and the legislative history of the Illinois
128
religious freedom provision suggest an independent construction.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide
whether it will follow the Smith rule without exception, so at a
minimum, the Illinois RFRA takes away the court's essential power to
fashion free exercise standards on a case-by-case basis.
1.

The Illinois RFRA Test Is Contrary to the
Few Illinois Cases on Point
129
Importantly, only a single Illinois case, Corlett v. Caserta,
mentions Smith. Despite this mention, however, the Illinois Appellate
Court did not base its holding on Smith; rather it arrived independently
at a similar conclusion. 130 Also, only four published Illinois cases make
any reference to Yoder or Sherbert, the two cases that the Illinois RFRA
seeks to "restore." Moreover, each of these four cases used the federal
precedent to limit, rather than protect, religious freedom claims. 131
126. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
127. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878, 881-83
(1990).
128. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the restrictions placed upon Illinois courts in interpreting the Illinois RFRA).
129. Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
130. See id. at 263.
131. On one occasion, an Illinois Appellate Court applied Sherbert to an unemployment com-
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Corlett v. Caserta involved a wrongful death suit where the patient
died after he refused a blood transfusion for religious reasons. 132 The
court held that although the deceased's exercise of his fundamental right
to refuse medical treatment should not be a complete bar to recovery,
the patient's estate should bear a proportionate share of tort liability
determined by the extent the death was proximately caused by his
decision.133
After reviewing Illinois tort law, then-appellate court Justice
McMorrow wrote: "We decline to create, for a patient who refuses a
reasonable life-saving medical treatment because of the patient's
religious convictions, an exemption from tort principles governing
mitigation of damages, comparative fault, and assumption of the
risk.''134 She went on to state that such an allocation of proportionate
liability "does not, in -our opinion, violate the patient's religious or
fundamental rights. The prerogative to exercise one's religious beliefs
does not permit a person, 'by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law
unto himself. .".'.-135
Although Corlett cited to and used the rationale
of Smith, the decision's careful analysis could also be viewed as using
the pre-Smith context-dependent approach to determine when an
exception to a general rule is good policy.
Arguably, the fact that the court in Corlett did not suggest that it was
changing Illinois law to follow a new test from Smith could reflect that
pensation case, but it erroneously limited the holding to cases where the person's refusal to work
on a Sabbath is required by a particular religious body. See Frazee v. Department of Employment
Sec., 512 N.E.2d 789, 791 (I11.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Frazee, holding that it
was enough that the claimant's refusal to work on Sundays was based on a sincerely held religious belief. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989).
Similarly, several cases used Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), to show that there is no
protection for personal preferences that are not integrally tied to religious beliefs. See Bethel
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533, 537 (I11.
App. Ct. 3d Dist.
1990) (holding that building a church on a particular piece of property is an unprotected preference and that protection is granted only if religious conduct is integrally related to a religious belief); In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (holding
that an ex-husband who sought court enforcement of a "get," a release to remarry under Jewish
law, had no right to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause under either the First Amendment
or Illinois Constitution, because this was a personal preference, not a protected religious belief);
see also In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (holding minor mature
enough to exercise the constitutional right to refuse blood transfusions and citing Yoder for principle that parents may not exercise religious beliefs in manner that jeopardizes health of child),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989).
132. See Corlett, 562 N.E.2d at 258-59.
133. See id. at 262, 264.
134. Id. at 262.
135. Id. at 263 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 885 (1990) (citation omitted)).

2000]

Why RFRAs Don't Work

its approach was already the law in Illinois, prior to the Smith decision.

This suggestion is based on the 1967 Illinois Supreme Court case,
Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir.136 In Warmbir, a woman
challenged a provision of the Mental Health Code which made spouses
liable where a patient was unable to pay. 137 Although she had grounds
for divorce, her religion prohibited her from getting a divorce. 138 The
woman claimed the statute penalized her for the practice of her religion
and operated to give an unfair preference to persons whose religion
permits divorce and to persons with no religion. 139 The Illinois
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 3 to mean that although
legislation seeking to discourage a particular religion would be invalid,
a statute that "is concerned with a legitimate governmental purpose is
not vitiated merely because as an incidental effect it may place at some
disadvantage persons of a particular religious faith."' 4
The paucity of Illinois free exercise cases makes it impossible to state
confidently that Corlett represents the Illinois Supreme Court's preSmith viewpoint on neutral laws that unintentionally burden religious
conduct. 14 1 Indeed, Warmbir and Corlett appear to be the only
precedent deciding whether religious objectors should be exempted
from neutral laws on free exercise grounds, and their holdings conform
to Smith.

136. Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d 4 (I11.
1967). It should be noted
that the Illinois constitutional provision has not been changed since the 1967 decision, though it
has been renumbered. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
137. See Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d at 5.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding, which had found the
statute unconstitutional, explaining that people are free to choose their religion and whether to
marry:
If in making these voluntary choices she feels herself bound to preserve the
marriage regardless of circumstances, she like everyone else who is married must
comply with requirement based upon that relationship. Any other rule would result in
a preference given to her particular religion.
Id. at 6. The claim in Warmbir, brought as a defense to a department collections suit, was one of
few defenses based exclusively on the Illinois Religious Freedom Provision and cited no federal
cases. See id.
141. There are no free exercise cases citing Warmbir and the Warmbir court relies on only
two, somewhat dubious, decisions. See Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d at 6; see also, e.g., Pacesetter
Homes, Inc. v. Village of S. Holland, 163 N.E.2d 464 (Ill.
1959) (striking down a broad Sunday
closing law as beyond the police power); Kut v. Albers Super Mkts., 66 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio 1946)
(suggesting that claimant's refusal to work on his Sabbath justified denial of unemployment compensation).
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Unlike Corlett and Warmbir, which involved general rules, the two
main lines of Illinois free exercise cases142--(1) zoning of churches and

religious institutions, and (2) refusal of medical treatment on religious
grounds-involve individualized determinations and, thus, presumably
would not be affected by Smith if the Illinois Supreme Court were to
explicitly adopt Smith. 14 3 These cases exemplify that Illinois courts
have never applied a "least restrictive means" test in free exercise cases.
As such, the Illinois RFRA, which uses a "least restrictive means test,"
changes the courts' standard of review.
The zoning cases all involve applications for special use permits,
which involves an individualized determination based on specified
criteria. 144 In the Illinois Supreme Court decision Columbus Park
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Board of Appeals,145 the court
established that where a zoning decision in some way limits the free
146
exercise of religion, the burden of proof shifts to the government.
Rather than establishing a standard for free exercise claims in the
zoning context, however, Columbus Park and its progeny give heavy
weight to religious interests within the traditional due process analysis,
proclaiming that religious freedom rises above mere property rights and
outweighs considerations of public inconvenience. 147

142. The third main group of Illinois Free Exercise cases involves First Amendment limitations on civil courts' role in church disputes. This third group, however, has little relevance in
this context. See, e.g., Apostolic New Life Church of Elgin v. Dominquez, 686 N.E.2d 1187,
1191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997).
143. See Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Comm'rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Colo.
1994) (holding that because a zoning permit decision involved an individualized hearing, the
Sherbert compelling interest test applied). Alternatively, one could view zoning code cases as
outside of Smith because they do not involve the same type of neutral law. Zoning codes specifically classify the use "churches," rather than regulating by using some more general category,
such as meeting houses.
144. See generally 3 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW
OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 41 (Edward H. Zieglar, Jr., ed., 4th ed. 1975) (discussing special
uses). See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 17 (1999) (setting forth special use standards and procedures).
145. Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witness v. Board of Appeals, 182 N.E.2d 722
(Ill. 1962).
146. See id. at 724.
147. See id. at 724-25 (holding that denying plaintiffs' right to locate their church at chosen
premises based on concerns of traffic congestion and business continuity bore no rational relation
to health, safety, and welfare); see also Our Savior's Evangelical Lutheran Church of Naperville
v. City of Naperville, 542 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989) (holding that denial of
special use permit for expansion of church's existing parking lot was unreasonable); Family
Christian Fellowship v. County of Winnebago, 503 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1986)
(holding that denial of permit for a proposed church and school at location of former public
school was arbitrary and unreasonable); Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Evanston, 445
N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983) (holding that denial of special use permit for Hasi-
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The second line of free exercise cases involves the refusal of medical

treatment for religious reasons. These free exercise claims arise in an
individualized context and involve hybrid rights, particularly the due
process liberty interest. Courts have recognized that the Illinois
Constitution's religious freedom provision and the Free Exercise Clause
14 8
protect the right to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons.
is limited, however, when it threatens
The exercise of religious liberty
49
the health or welfare of others. 1
The one case decided to date under the new Illinois RFRA, City of
Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and
Ministries,150 applied the statute in such a surprising manner that its
ramifications are uncertain, although it is helpful to government lawyers
in arguing Illinois RFRA cases. The trial court found denial of a special
use permit to locate a church in a commercial zone invalid under
Columbus Park. The appellate court, however, reversed, ostensibly
applying the new Illinois RFRA standards. 15 1 In so doing, the court
found a compelling interest in the city's desire to reinvigorate its
commercial corridor and create a strong tax base.' 5 2 The court further
determined that the ordinance was the least restrictive means of
pursuing these interests because approximately sixty percent of Chicago
Heights was zoned noncommercial, and churches could locate in noncommercial zones without special permits. 153 Although surely a

dic Jewish student center infringed on plaintiffs' freedom of religion); cf. Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533, 536-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1990) (relying
on several federal free exercise cases to use a cost-balancing approach and concluding that government should approve request for higher enrollment cap on religious school and permit more
parking).
148. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (upholding a
woman's right to refuse a Cesarean section in violation of her religious beliefs); see also In re
Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (11. 1965) (finding a First Amendment violation in forcing
a Jehovah's Witness through a court-appointed conservator to accept blood transfusions in violation of her religion).
149. See Brooks, 205 N.E.2d at 442 (noting one reason that the court upheld the refusal to accept transfusion was that the woman had no dependent children); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (I11. 1952) (upholding an order that permitted medically necessary
blood transfusions to a baby against a federal and state constitutional free exercise challenge).
150. City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries,
707 N.E.2d 53 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998), appeal granted,714 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1999); see also
County of Kankakee v. Anthony, 710 N.E.2d 1242, 1249 (111.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1999) (taking
note of the new Illinois RFRA, but "findling] it unnecessary to consider it in the instant [zoning]
case in light of our decision to resolve the case on grounds unrelated to the constitutional
claims").
151. See Living Word Outreach,707 N.E.2d at 59-60.
152. See id. at 59.
153. See id.
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counterintuitive result of the Illinois RFRA, Living Word Outreach
shows the potential flexibility of the supposed strict scrutiny
54
standard. 1
2. Illinois Courts are not Bound to Interpret the Illinois Religious
Freedom Provision Lockstep and, thus, the Illinois RFRA Unduly
Interferes with Judicial Selection of a Standard
The Illinois Supreme Court has been criticized in the past for
following what is known as the "lockstep doctrine," in which United
States Supreme Court Bill of Rights cases are viewed as controlling
Illinois courts' interpretation of similar provisions in the Illinois
Constitution.' 55 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, is more likely to
interpret its freedom of religion provision independently. Without
lockstep, it is unclear whether the Illinois Supreme Court will agree
with the Smith categorical rule or do a more context-dependent analysis.
Because the judicial role in developing the contours of religious
freedom is great, the Illinois RFRA's interference with the judiciary's
56
prerogative is also great. 1
Generally, the state court trend is toward independent constitutional
analysis. 157 For example, in People v. DiGuida,158 the Illinois Supreme
Court made clear that it is not automatically bound to follow federal
precedent "where the language of the State constitution, or where
debates and committee reports of the constitutional convention show

154. Restrictive interpretations of the compelling interest test occurred under the federal
RFRA and pre-Smith First Amendment cases. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text
(discussing pre-Smith cases decided under a stricter "context-dependent balancing" standard). It
should be noted that generally in special use situations, courts look to the state's interest in the
particular zoning decision, rather than the interests served by the Zoning Code as a whole.
155. See generally Thomas McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent Legal
Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S.ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1987) (criticizing the
Illinois lockstep doctrine); Seng, supra note 29, at 93 (noting lack of state constitutional commentary about First Amendment issues); Roger Kangas, Comment, Interpretingthe Illinois Constitution: Supreme Court Plays Follow the Leader, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1271 (1987) (analyzing
the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the United States Supreme Court's interpretations); Rick
A. Swanson, Comment, Regaining Lost Ground: Toward a Public Forum Doctrine Under the
Illinois Constitution, 18 S.ILL. U. L.J. 453 (1994) (examining Illinois' adoption and application
of the public forum doctrine).
156. Alternatively, if lockstep forces Illinois courts to follow Smith, then arguably the Illinois
RFRA is purposely directed toward overturning the Illinois Supreme Court approach.
157. See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 235, 244-47 (1998) (noting the increasing number of states that
are electing to apply their own analysis to Free Exercise Clause cases).
158. People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992).
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that the Framers intended a different construction, it will construe
similar provisions in a different way ... ."159
The Illinois religious freedom provision contains markedly different
terms from the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution,
including express limitations on religious liberty. The legislative
history of the Illinois provision indicates that these qualifications were
purposeful. Specifically, the religious freedom section was redrafted in
the 1870 Constitution to include the phrase: "but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to ... excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the State." The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
extensively debated this provision and a number of the delegates
objected to its inclusion. 160 Supporters, whose version prevailed and
was included in the current 1970 Constitution, argued that many
16 1
practices condemned by society were religiously motivated.
The 1970 Constitutional Convention retained the religious freedom
provision in its entirety after hearing witnesses primarily on the
parochial school aid question. 162 In response to questions regarding
whether the provision was read the same way as the federal clause, the
Bill of Rights Committee responded that the two were closely parallel,
but the Illinois provision might be more restrictive. 163 A proposed
159. Id. at 342 (holding that the state action requirement is implicit in both federal and Illinois
free speech provisions); accord People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 875 (I1I. 1988)
(construing the Illinois Constitution's "right to a jury trial" provision as distinguishable from the
comparable provision in the United States Constitution).
160. See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS OF 1869-70, 1559-66 (1870).
161. See id. (citing to Mormon polygamy, a recent nudist sect, and foreign examples of child
sacrifice and wife burning). The 1869-1870 Constitutional Convention predated the decision in
Reynolds v. United States, where the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that criminal
laws against polygamy could not be applied to those belonging to the Mormon religion, which
required it. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
162. See Proposal on Religious Freedom from the Committee on Bill of Rights, in 6 RECORD
OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1969-70, at 21-22 (1970).
Because the area of the free exercise of religion is so sensitive and there are many Illinois cases
interpreting the provision, the consensus was that the better course was not to make any changes.
See Verbatim Transcript of May 29, 1970, in 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1969-70, at 1372 (1970).
163. See Verbatim Transcript of May 29, 1970, supra note 162, at 1372-73. Note that the Illinois Constitution cannot be "more restrictive," if that means placing greater restrictions on free
exercise than the Free Exercise Clause allows. Even if the government action did not violate the
Illinois provision, the claimant still would be entitled to relief under the First Amendment. Given
the current interpretation of the First Amendment under Smith, arguably, the text and legislative
history of the Illinois religious freedom provision limits the exercise of religious conduct in a
manner similar to Smith, but perhaps more restrictively than a plain reading, or earlier interpretations, of the federal provision.
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amendment to substitute wording identical to the Free Exercise Clause
was defeated, primarily because it was thought wiser to leave this
sensitive area untouched. 164 Thus, the legislative history of this
165

provision provides support for an independent interpretation.

In the more likely case that the Illinois Supreme Court decides to do
an independent analysis of the Illinois religious freedom provision,
without the Illinois RFRA's statutory constraint, the court could
interpret the Illinois text in a variety of ways. The only case to analyze
that provision, In re C.L.T., 166 relied on the limiting language to reject a
mother's free exercise challenge to an order allowing her child to
choose his own religious training. 167 Conversely, the Minnesota
Supreme Court's treatment of an almost identical provision exemplifies
another approach: "[s]ection 16 also expressly limits the governmental
interests that may outweigh religious liberty. Only the government's
interest in peace or safety or against acts of licentiousness will excuse
an imposition on religious freedom under the Minnesota
Constitution."' 168 Minnesota's differing interpretation of the religious
freedom provision, however, could be attributed to the different tones of
the Minnesota and Illinois Constitutions. Specifically, the Minnesota

164. See Verbatim Transcript of August 5, 1970, 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1969-70, at 3643-46 (1970).
165. There is some argument, however, that the illinois Supreme Court may look to the drafters of the 1970 Constitution and conclude that their intention was to read Illinois' provision identically to the Free Exercise Clause. A comprehensive guide to and analysis of the 1870 Constitution, which was prepared to assist the 1970 delegates stated: "[T]hough the state seems to have
spelled out areas of permissible governmental interference with religious practices ... the kinds
of interferences which would be held valid under state law would in all probability be held valid
under federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment .... G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16 (1970). This guide
was prepared prior to Wisconsin v. Yoder and, thus, it is possible that after Yoder, all would have
agreed that there might be situations where the federal constitution would recognize a free exercise claim; while the claim would be denied if brought under the Illinois Constitution's more restrictive language. See also Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 744 (I11.
1973) (concluding that it was the Constitutional Convention delegates' intent to follow the federal
Establishment Clause in retaining Article 1, Section 3, a provision specifically banning public aid
to parochial schools).
166. In re C.L.T., 540 N.E.2d 1043 (I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989).
167. See id. at 1045 (finding that a mother's religion was intertwined with excessive discipline
and control and noting that the Illinois Constitution "expressly limits religious freedom in those
instances which interfere 'with the peace or safety of the State."' (quoting People ex rel. Wallace
v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74 (il.
1952))).
168. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990). On remand after Smith, the
court held that the Minnesota Constitution required the "compelling state interest/least restrictive
means test" and barred strict application of a safety sticker law to Amish objectors. Id. at 396,
399. The court declined to evaluate whether the case could be viewed as a hybrid case under the
Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 396.
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Constitution grants a broad affirmative guarantee of rights whereas the
Illinois Constitution focuses on nondiscriminatory treatment. 169 At the
same time, at least six state supreme courts have explicitly rejected
170
Smith and reaffirmed strict scrutiny under their state constitutions.
The Illinois Supreme Court could reasonably do the same.
C. Illinois Separationof Powers-Conclusion
The Illinois RFRA's attempted "restoration" of a "compelling
interest/least restrictive means" test does not comport with Illinois
courts' existing interpretation of the Illinois Constitution's religious
freedom provision. Under the separation of powers cases, the
legislature cannot change a judicial interpretation of a constitutional
right by statute.
Alternatively, the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet had the
opportunity to confront Smith, so the Illinois RFRA unduly interferes
with the essential judicial function of interpreting the Illinois
Constitution. Once confronted with the freedom of religion provision,
the court may extend the holding and reasoning of Warmbir to every
case, or it may agree with the state supreme courts that have rejected
Smith under their own state constitutions. Alternatively, the court may
continue the Corlett approach, which carefully analyzes each context.
Because the Illinois RFRA has taken this discretion away from the
Illinois Supreme Court, it violates the Separation of Powers Clause
under Best v. Taylor Machine Works and related cases.
The separation of powers cases analyzing legislative encroachments
on the judicial prerogative focus primarily on the contours of judicial
power. Whether the legislature acts outside its area of competence is
also relevant to the separation of powers question and, therefore, a
discussion of the proper role of the legislature in making laws is
necessary. The main source of the Illinois RFRA's constitutional
problems-that it does not identify any actual, tangible problem
suffered by religious persons-also gives rise to a fundamental question
about the legislature's power to enact the statute: Does it exceed the

169. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("The right of every man to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed ... nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted .... ), with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever
be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on
account of his religious opinions .... ").

170. See Crane, supra note 157, at 245 n.71 (citing various state supreme court decisions that
have rejected Smith).
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limits of the police power when it acts without naming any problem
other than disagreement with a constitutional test?
Generally, the courts have described the Illinois Legislature's power
to enact laws as very broad and unlimited except where restricted by the
Constitution. 17 1 Although the Illinois RFRA does not raise due process
concerns, the test used in substantive due process cases nicely illustrates
what is often viewed as the minimal standard for legislation. There,
courts ask "whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the
evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public
health, safety and welfare."' 17 2 In the present case, the only threat to the
welfare of religious persons that the legislature has identified is that
posed by an unpopular United States Supreme Court decision.
Similarly, when evaluating legislative classifications using the
minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, courts ask
173
whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
An interesting comparison can be made to Romer v. Evans,174 where the
Supreme Court held that a Colorado statute, which prohibited any law,
or executive or court order from giving homosexuals "protected status,"
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The law failed the rational basis
test, because it was so extraordinarily broad that it bore no rational
relationship to the purported justifications of protecting the
associational rights of anti-homosexual landlords and employers. 75 In
fact, "its sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything [other than]
animus toward the class it affects .... "176
The Illinois RFRA is equally broad in scope; it affects every state and
local law and government action. Indeed, the statute itself does not
present any justifications other than protecting religious freedoms. Of
course, the Equal Protection Clause would not be used for evaluating a
claim that a statute favors religion over "irreligion" because the
171. See, e.g., People v. Francis, 239 N.E.2d 129, 140 (Ill. 1968) (upholding Public Junior
College Act's scheme of electing board members); Richardson v. Mulcahey, 637 N.E.2d 1217,
1219 (111.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1994) (upholding constitutionality of a statute that allowed a county to
simultaneously adopt "an executive form of government and to opt out of home-rule status").
172. People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. 1992) (quoting People v. Bradley, 403 N.E.2d
1029, 1032 (Ill. 1980)) (upholding statute imposing harsher penalty for criminal sexual assault of
persons aged 13-16 when perpetrator was more than five years older than victim); see also People
v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700, 711 (111. 1991) (applying this test to determine whether the law at issue
infringed on individuals' Fourteenth Amendment rights).
173. See, e.g., Reed, 591 N.E.2d at 459 (recognizing the two tests as essentially equivalent).
174. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
175. See id. at 635.
176. id. at 632.
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Establishment Clause governs such cases. But, as shown in Part IV
below, courts scrutinize statutory preferences to religion with greater
care than the rational basis test. 177 Thus, the Illinois RFRA's extreme
generality and complete failure to address a tangible evil raises
questions about whether the legislature has exceeded its powers. Where
the legislature has acted outside the scope of its competence, as in the
present case, courts should be more likely to find that it has crossed the
permeable line demarcating the separation of powers.
IV. RFRA VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND IS AN INVALID PREFERENCE

The Illinois RFRA also violates the Establishment Clause and the
Illinois Constitution because it is an across-the-board qualified
exemption from general laws, which is applied to religious objectors
alone, and is not directed at lifting any actual, identified burden on
religious practices. This Part will discuss the criteria of the test
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman1 78 and the endorsement test 179 and
will then show that this statute fails under both because it is not a
defensible accommodation.' 80 Next, this Part will argue that the statute
also violates the Illinois Constitution's express prohibition against
religious preferences. 18 1 Finally, this Part will demonstrate the solid
rationale for this conclusion by applying the Illinois RFRA to one class
of covered persons: religious organizations performing work identical to
182
that of secular entities but with religious motivations.
A. The Lemon and Endorsement Tests and the Accommodation Cases
Under the familiar Lemon test, a law violates the Establishment
Clause if it: (1) does not have a secular purpose; (2) has the primary
effect of advancing religion; or (3) leads to excessive entanglement
between church and state. 183 The endorsement test, championed by
177. See infra Part IV (examining how the RFRA violates the Establishment Clause and its
equivalent in the Illinois Constitution).
178. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
179. See infra Part IV.A.
180. Accord Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 58, at 448-50, 457 (discussing religious exemption
cases before Smith); Hamilton, supra note 86, at 8-14 (arguing that the federal RFRA is unconstitutional); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal
Protectionand Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1995) (concluding that the exemption of nonreligious claims from RFRA litigation raises constitutional concerns).
181. See infra Part IV.B.
182. See infra Part IV.C.
183. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The United States Supreme Court in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997), recently suggested that the "excessive entanglement" inquiry be incorpo-
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Justice O'Connor and relied on by the majority in several Supreme
Court cases,1 84 asks whether an objective observer would perceive the
statute as conveying a governmental message of endorsement of
religion.
At bottom, the Illinois RFRA has no secular purpose. The Illinois
Legislature never identified or referred to any specific burden on
religious practices. Rather, the legislative history of the statute
evidences concern over its breadth, while the statute's proponents spoke
of restoring the standard of review ostensibly used prior to Smith.'8 5 As
discussed above, where a law has a universal scope far in excess of any
societal ill it purports to address its "sheer breadth" reveals a motivation
to favor or disfavor the affected class, rather than a valid legislative
86
purpose. 1
Comparing the strict scrutiny test of the Illinois RFRA with the more
moderate balancing tests used elsewhere to protect similar rights also
suggests that the Illinois RFRA has an improper purpose of favoring
religion. For instance, where content-neutral laws burden speech,
another critical First Amendment value, the Supreme Court requires
only that the law be "narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate... interests." 187 Similarly, Title VII imposes on employers
the duty to "reasonably accommodate" the religious practices of their
88
employees, but only where they can do so without "undue hardship."'
1. The Accommodation Cases under the Lemon
and the Endorsement Tests
The Illinois RFRA would be analyzed as an accommodation case,
which are those cases involving laws that give special treatment to
religious actors. Because government neutrality between different
rated into the primary effect test. See id. at 232-34. Courts, however, still refer to the three-part
test.
184. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985). But see Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 775 (1996). In Capital Square, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, rejected the endorsement test in a case involving private speech in a public square. Five Justices, however, disagreed and gave support to the test. See id. at 772-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 785
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 800-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the statute's legislative history).
186. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (discussing Romer v. Evans).
187. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (finding New York regulations
regarding the volume of amplified music allowed to be broadcast from a Central Park bandshell
to be a valid time, place or manner restriction).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S.

60, 63 (1986) (interpreting this statute).
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religions is a "well-grounded" principle in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, 189 these cases walk a fine line between aiding religious
freedom and avoiding establishment violations. The United States
Supreme Court has summarized the accommodation cases as
"allow[ing] the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating
special burdens."' 19 Looking at two principle accommodation cases,
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos' 9' illustrates the application of the Lemon test, while
Texas Monthly v. Bullock' 92 applies the endorsement test. 193 Both
cases, however, show that the Illinois RFRA fails to provide a sufficient
justification for favoring religion over "irreligion."
Amos held that applying section 702, the religious organization
exemption to Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination
based on religion, to secular non-profit activities of a religious
organization did not violate the Establishment Clause. 194 The Court
held that there was a valid secular purpose in "alleviat[ing] significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions." 195 While the Free
Exercise Clause may require only that religious groups be able to select
religious employees for religious positions, the Court found the line
between secular purpose and religious functions "hardly a bright one,"
so that fear of potential liability might unduly inhibit a religious
196
organization.
Amos is distinguishable from Illinois RFRA in several ways. Amos'
focus on protecting the internal management of church organizations is
grounded in an established line of noninterference cases. 197 Amos is
also consistent with the recurring principle that courts are not equipped
189. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994).
190. Id. at 705 (holding that New York's creation of a special school district identical to the
borders of a religious enclave went too far, by "crossing the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment").
191. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
192. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
193. See id. at 8; Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.

194. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
195. Id. at 335.
196. Id. at 336.
197. For example, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits civil courts from resolving disputes involving church property and internal church affairs. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese for
United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976) (holding that decisions of
ecclesiastical tribunals are binding upon civil courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution); see also supra note 147 (discussing cases involving First
Amendment limitations on the role of civil courts in church disputes).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

to say what kind of conduct is required by a religion. 198 Further, the
special treatment accorded religious organizations in Amos was quite
narrow: section 702 did not even relieve religious organizations from all
of Title VII's general prohibitions, let alone apply to all burdensome
199
laws.
The Court in Amos also held that the statute satisfied the second
prong of the Lemon test, which it characterized as permitting churches
2 °
to advance religion, so long as the government itself does not do so. W
As Justice O'Connor rightly recognized, this description of the "effects"
test would mean that almost no law violates it.20 1 Moreover, the Amos
Court's discussion of when a statutory accommodation satisfies the
Lemon test was qualified by its recognition that it is constitutionally
permissible to benefit religious entities exclusively only when
government acts with "the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion .... "202
The Illinois RFRA violates the Lemon test because, at bottom, it has
no secular purpose. The legislature never identified or referred to any
actual burden on religious practices. In addition, the Illinois RFRA
violates the second prong of Lemon, even under Amos, because it
unconstitutionally advances religion. Where a statute gives such a
decided advantage to religious organizations and persons who assert a
religious motivation, the government provides a powerful incentive for
individuals to join the favored group, or at least to cloak oneself in a
religious mantle when in conflict with an onerous legal requirement.
The ultimate principle in the accommodation cases is the same,
whether couched in terms of Lemon or endorsement. As shown in
Texas Monthly, the endorsement test similarly requires an identifiable
20 3
burden before approving a government accommodation of religion.
In Texas Monthly, the Court struck down a statute exempting only
198. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886
(1990) (stating that the First Amendment limits the role of civil courts in resolving church disputes).
199. Religious entities still are proscribed from racial discrimination, for example, even given
a sincere belief that their religions demands it. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983) (upholding the withdrawal of tax-exempt status from schools that practice racial discrimination on religious grounds).
200. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
201. See id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 338.
203. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 348

(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Of course, in order to perceive the government action as a permissible accommodation of religion, there must be in fact an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action.").
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religious periodicals from Texas sales tax. 20 4 This targeted relief was
thus unlike the property tax exemption upheld in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York, 20 5 which was extended to a broad range of
civic institutions, so that it had both a secular purpose and effect.
Because there had been no showing that payment of sales tax inhibited
the purchase of religious magazines, and secular interests did not
receive the benefit, the statute was deemed closer to the religious
favoritism previously invalidated by the Court. 20 6 The Court recognized
that unjustifiable benefits to religious organizations "cannot but
'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the
207
community."
Similarly, the Illinois RFRA clearly benefits only religious persons.
It grants to all persons who believe government has burdened their
religiously-motivated conduct a qualified exception-an exception by
definition not currently required by the Free Exercise Clause. The next
step in the accommodation case analysis is to identify a special burden
to which religious adherents are subjected to as a result of some
government action, which the challenged statute seeks to lift. But the
only burden Illinois RFRA alleviates is that imposed by Smith itself: not
being exempted from general laws. Under Texas Monthly, this is
unconstitutional endorsement.
Further, although some have argued that because RFRA is triggered
by a "substantial burden" on religious exercise, most applications of the
statute will themselves be valid accommodations, 2 8 this does not solve
204. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
205. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
206. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 29 (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703, 711 (1985) (holding that a Connecticut statute that gives Sabbath observers the absolute
right not to work on their Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause).
207. Id. at 15 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice Brennan in
Texas Monthly did posit that where a religion-specific exemption does not impose substantial
burdens on non-beneficiaries, it might be permissible. See id. at 18 n.8. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding public-school release time for outside religious instruction)).
Because RFRA is so broad, it is not possible to foresee its effects on non-beneficiaries. More
powerfully, RFRA provides for exemptions to general laws, which presumably are there to serve
the overall public good. So, allowing subsets of people to escape the laws' directives must have
at least some negative results. Further, because Texas Monthly involved a subsidy, in that nonpayment of sales tax indirectly puts money otherwise belonging to the taxpayers in the hands of
religious organizations, some courts have required that any statutory exemption of religious organizations from a general law be limited to non-profit entities. See, e.g., Cohen v. City of Des
Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1993). RFRA contains no such limitation, so that some applications of the statute would be even more problematic because they would entail a subsidy.
208. See Berg, supra note 58, at 61 ("There is a greater likelihood that recognizing mere financial or paperwork burdens will create multiple exemptions or inducements to practice religion.").
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the Illinois RFRA's flaws. Facial challenges to statutes brought under
the Establishment Clause are evaluated under the Lemon test, which

looks at the purpose and effect of the statute itself; it is not sufficient
that some applications of the law would be valid, if the law itself were
valid. 20 9
B.

RFRA Violates the Illinois Constitution's
ProhibitionAgainst Preferences

An even stronger case can be made that the Illinois RFRA violates
the Illinois Constitution's prohibitions on religious preferences. 2 10 First,
the text of the Illinois religious freedom section, which prohibits "any
preference" to religion rather than the "establishment" of religion,
suggests a lesser tolerance for laws specially benefiting religion. Next,
in the Warmbir case, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to exempt a
religious claimant from a neutral law because such an exemption would
2 11
result in an unconstitutional preference for the woman's religion.
Based on Warmbir's holding, one could argue that going beyond the
Smith view of free exercise creates an invalid religious preference under
the Illinois Constitution. Although some commentators may contend
that the Illinois Supreme Court has already decided to follow federal
Establishment Clause precedent lockstep, the textual differences
between the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution,
coupled with Illinois' trend toward independent analysis make it more
likely that Illinois courts will determine anew whether to analyze the
2 12
issue separately.
209. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) ("There is precedent in this area of
constitutional law for distinguishing between the validity of the statute on its face and its validity
in particular applications.").
210. The Illinois Constitution's prohibition of religious preferences states: "nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship." ILL. CONST. art. I, §
3.
211. See Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d 4, 4-6 (IlI. 1967); supra notes
136-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Warmbir).
212. In Board of Education v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. 1973), after an extensive discussion of the relevant committee report, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly held that the intent of the
1970 Constitution's framers was that any program that is constitutional under the Establishment
Clause is also constitutional under Article X, Section 3, the specific constitutional prohibition on
public funding of sectarian institutions. See id. at 745. There was some legislative history to the
contrary that indicated that Article X, Section 3 is more restrictive in that even if the United
States Supreme Court becomes more favorable to public aid to sectarian schools, the specific Illinois Constitution provision will continue to prohibit it. See Seng, supra note 29, at 100-04 (stating that "if federal decisions became less restrictive, the Illinois Supreme Court still could hold
that Article X, § 3 prohibited public aid to sectarian schools"); see also Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d at
750 (Ryan, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority by failing to equate the Illinois Constitution with the United States Constitution). In the next case on the subject, the court interpreted
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Illinois' accommodation cases also support the argument that the

Illinois RFRA violates Illinois' ban on religious preferences.

In

Heckmann v. Cemeteries Association of Greater Chicago,2 13 the main

Illinois case analyzing a government accommodation of religion, the
court upheld a statute that invalidated union contracts prohibiting all
burials on Sundays. 2 14 The legislature passed the statute to help certain
Jewish groups who were unable to bury their dead in accordance with
215
their prescribed rituals because of the existing no-Sunday-burial rule.
The court found no violation of the Establishment Clause or of Illinois'
Article I, Section 3 religious preference ban. The court first noted that
statutes enacted to eliminate even unintentional discrimination and to
accommodate religious beliefs have a secular purpose. 2 16 The court
then held that the statute did not have a primary effect of advancing
religion because: "[tlhe Act does [sic] confer a benefit to one group to
the exclusion of others, but relieves a burden on those who were unable
217
to freely exercise their beliefs.Heckmann is an excellent example of the legislative ability to correct
a concrete, serious obstacle to a minority group's religious practice
upon recognizing an unintentional burden to that practice. 218 The
distinction between conferring a special statutory right versus relieving

Bakalis as stating that the federal and state prohibitions were identical: "section 3 of article X of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 imposes restrictions concerning establishment of religion that are
identical to those imposed by the first amendment.... Thus, any statute which is valid under the
first amendment is also valid under the constitution of Illinois." People ex rel. Klinger v.
Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Il1. 1973) (holding several state funding programs for children
attending non-public schools unconstitutional according to the Establishment Clause). The court
in Bakalis only skirted around making such a definitive pronouncement with respect to the religious preference ban. See Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d at 745-46. Instead, the Bakalis court concluded
that because the busing statute at issue satisfied the Lemon test, no violation of Article I, Section
3 had occurred. See id. at 745-46 (rejecting a challenge to a statute providing state-funded busing
for private school students, approximately 90% of whom were Catholic). Thus, it is unsettled
whether the Illinois Supreme Court may choose to do an independent analysis of Article I, Section 3, when confronted with a case outside of the controversial school aid context.
213. Heckmann v. Cemeteries Ass'n. of Greater Chicago, 468 N.E.2d 1354 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1984).
214. See id. at 1359.
215. See id. at 1358.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Similarly, Congress has made numerous specific, valid accommodations to address identified obstacles to religious exercise that the Free Exercise Clause did not resolve. In the wake of
Goldman v, Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), Congress passed a statute allowing religiouslymandated headgear for military personnel. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 774 (West 1994). Following Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation, Congress decided not to fund a road project
on federal land sacred to Native Americans. See H.R. REP. No. 100-713, at 72 (1988).
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a recognized burden is especially germane in light of Article I, Section
2 19
3's focus on nondiscrimination.
C. A ProblematicApplication of the Illinois RFRA
Without arguing that there are no cases in which courts should
exempt religious groups from general laws, one application of the
Illinois RFRA demonstrates why its overly broad scope is
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Illinois RFRA's imposition of a strict
scrutiny test even when laws are applied to religiously motivated
conduct that is identical to secular conduct is unfair and contrary to
nonestablishment principles.
The above problem is exemplified through a specific application of
the federal RFRA, which contained the same strict scrutiny test as the
Illinois RFRA. A number of courts held that the federal RFRA
compelled zoning administrators to allow churches to operate homeless
shelters and soup kitchens in residential locations, despite the fact that
their secular charitable counterparts, which were performing an
identical function, were banned from doing so. 220 One court accepted
the church members' assertion that provision of food and shelter to the
poor flows from their religious beliefs and, thus, is an exercise of those
beliefs.2 21 In another case, the court held that the zoning code
substantially burdened plaintiffs' religion because the plaintiffs had
219. The other Illinois case that upheld a law making an exception for religious interests is
Pre-School Owners Association v. Department of Children and Family Services, 518 N.E.2d
1018, 1027 (11. 1988). Pre-School Owners is not a true "accommodation" case because it involved a day-care licensing statute that did not single out religious schools, but instead included
exemptions for a broad range of other, secular types of schools and day-care centers for a variety
of rationales. See id. at 1024. In Pre-School Owners, the court applied Amos and found no violation of the Establishment Clause or Article I, Section 3. See id. The Free Exercise Clause,
however, probably required the statute because it was narrowly targeted at non-profit day-care
centers that operated primarily to provide religious education and received no governmental aid.
See id. But see Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 495 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
zoning ordinance that permitted churches to have day-care centers in single-family residential
districts even though other operators had to obtain special use permits did not violate the Establishment Clause).
220. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (E.D.
Va. 1996) (granting temporary restraining order barring enforcement of zoning code against
church-operated shelter because it violated RFRA); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of
Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that enforcement of zoning
regulations to bar church-sponsored soup kitchen was an impermissible burden on church's religious freedom under RFRA); Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544
N.W.2d 698, 705 (Mich. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that board's decision that ordinance did not allow homeless shelter as "accessory use" to church violated RFRA). But see Daytona Rescue
Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (upholding
denial of permit for operation of church-sponsored shelter and soup kitchen against RFRA claim).
221. See Jesus Center, 544 N.W.2d at 703.
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demonstrated that inviting the homeless into their church as part of
222
worship was central to their faith.
Although the churches' work in these cases is both admirable and
necessary, 223 the distinction between social work performed by
churches or religious organizations versus non-sectarian, equally
charitable groups, is not. Making a distinction based on those motivated
by theistic versus humanistic values as the predicate for exemptions
from otherwise valid laws is an insurmountable obstacle to the Illinois
RFRA's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. 224 This flaw
in RFRA is especially egregious as the Establishment Clause expands to
allow equal participation by religious entities in government aid that
helps fund many worthwhile community goals. This expansion is
demonstrated by Bowen v. Kendrick,225 which re-invigorated the
principle that the First Amendment does not prohibit religious
institutions from participating in "publicly sponsored social welfare
programs." This trend continued in Agostini v. Felton,226 where the
Supreme Court reversed its earlier holding in Aguilar v. Felton227 and
held that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit school districts

222. See Stuart Circle, 946 F. Supp. at 1239; see also Marc-Olivier Langlois, Note, The SubstantialBurden of Municipal Zoning: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act as a Means to Consistent Protectionfor Church-Sponsored Homeless Shelters and Soup Kitchens, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS J. 1259, 1279 (1996) (arguing that under the religious tradition of sanctuary,
churches are the appropriate place to feed and house the poor and, thus, once a church operates in
a given location, any zoning burden on the charitable function impermissibly regulates methods
of worship).
223. To place these comments in my own context, I volunteered in homeless shelters for several years, including helping to start one in a church basement located in an urban residential
neighborhood.
224. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that allowing an exemption from a zoning law for a religious group, but not others,
shows a "preference" for religion, which is forbidden by the First Amendment); Ira C. Lupu, Why
the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 809 (1998) (asserting that serious nonestablishment objection to federal RFRA as applied to federal laws would be saved by "limiting its protection to concerns of
secular conscience").
225. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (upholding grants for teen sex counseling
under the Adolescent Family Life Act to a wide spectrum of social and health organizations, including religiously affiliated and religiously inspired ones). Bowen relied on an earlier case,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which the Court upheld a District of Columbia construction grant for a religiously affiliated hospital. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609. "Whether the
individuals who compose the corporation under its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics...
is of not the slightest consequence .... Nor is it material that the hospital may be conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church." Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 298.
226. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
227. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
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from sending public school teachers into parochial schools to conduct
remedial education classes for poor students under Title 1.228 Moreover,

the Wisconsin Supreme Court has even approved government vouchers
for parochial school tuition, reflecting the Establishment Clause's
change in the government aid arena. 229 Based on all of these cases, all
levels of government involved in distributing public funds for
humanitarian purposes go to creative lengths to include organizations
animated by religious goals and to ensure that religious organizations
are not discriminated against or shut out of the public purse.230 Given
this inclusion, it is especially unjust to legislate that those same
organizations can obtain exemptions from neutral laws that burden their
projects, while their secular counterparts are given no such tool.
Zoning cases involving shelters may be a less than perfect example of
this problem because many of them-but not al1231-involve
individualized hearings where Smith would not apply. In Illinois, even
without RFRA, religious claims get special deference in special use
permit appeals. 232 No Illinois state court case, however, has applied this
deferential standard to charitable uses such as shelters, and pre-RFRA
Illinois zoning law did not require the government to demonstrate the
"least restrictive means." Moreover, the Illinois RFRA as written
would apply to a wide variety of religiously-motivated charity work and
the neutral laws that apply to them. For example: health codes apply to
soup kitchens; building codes apply to shelters and transitional
residences; and licensing requirements apply to day-care centers.
Because waiving any particular rule in a given instance might not
228. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35.
229. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998) (upholding Milwaukee Parental School Choice Program), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 467 (1998); see also Helms v. Picard, 151
F.3d 347, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that giving computer to parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause), cert. grantedsub. nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999).
230. See, e.g., Rosalind Rossi, Fearing Suit, Cristo Rey High Rejects Federal Grant, CHI.
SuN-TIMmS, Nov. 26, 1998, at 16; Rosalind Rossi & Fran Spielman, Grant Aids Kids' Work Program; Government Money Benefits Catholic Students, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at 8 (discussing school board's rejection of a grant for Cristo Rey High School Work Study Program despite city attorneys' attempt to comply with the Establishment Clause); see also 24 C.F.R. §
570.200j(2) (1996) (containing federal regulations explaining in detail how to set up corporate
entities to structure Community Development Block Grants to religious organizations in a constitutional manner).
231. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D.
Va. 1996) (involving the municipal prosecution of a violation of a zoning code provision that
limited churches to feeding and housing programs for no more than 30 persons on no more than
eight occasions in winter before falling under a different zoning category); cf. C.L.U.B. v. City of
Chicago, No. 94 C 6151, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2230 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1996) (challenging city
aldermen instituting zoning code restrictions on churches).
232. See supra notes 144-47 (describing cases dealing with special use permits).
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threaten public health and safety, under the Illinois RFRA, those
carrying out a religious mission could be entitled to exceptions, while
those merely doing good works would be bound by each detailed
regulation.
Asserting that the Illinois RFRA is unconstitutional, of course, does
not restrict the government from redressing any actual burdens on
religious conduct by passing an accommodation statute targeted at
lifting that burden. For example, suppose that a municipality evaluated
its homelessness problem and discovered that while secular charities
tended to use empty warehouses for shelters, which were located in
districts already open to that use, churches and religious groups wanted
to open shelters in closed-down convents and parish schools, located in
residential areas that were not currently zoned for this new use.
Arguably, the municipality could change its zoning code to
accommodate the proposed use by lifting the burden on churches'
ability to serve the poor in this way without violating the Establishment
Clause, even though such an exemption is not required by the Free
Exercise Clause.
The Illinois RFRA's universal mandate for treating religiously
motivated conduct more favorably under the law than identical conduct
motivated by other worthwhile values violates the Establishment Clause
and Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution. It goes beyond the
demands of religious freedom and subverts the neutrality principle
underlying our constitutional protections.
V. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES

The Smith decision does not constitute the best possible approach to
the balancing of interests necessary where religious claims confront
general laws, but the Illinois RFRA's effort to overrule it is
unconstitutional. It is up to the Illinois courts, and not the legislature, to
determine whether to embrace Smith in full; ultimately reject Smith's
categorical stance, or find some middle ground. In Warmbir, the
Illinois Supreme Court made one pronouncement identical to Smith and
in Corlett, a more recent case, the Illinois appellate court decision
followed the Smith rationale after evaluating the particular context.
Given that the scope of and the trigger for the Illinois RFRA are
identical to that of the Illinois Constitution's religious freedom
provision and that the statute was enacted purely to "restore" a standard
of review, any distinction between the two is functionally meaningless.
Arguably, the Illinois RFRA attempts to overrule judicial interpretations
of the Illinois Constitution. In addition, RFRA takes away from the
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Illinois courts one of its most cherished functions-its primary role in
interpreting the Illinois Constitution in a gradual, organic fashion-and
substitutes the legislature's own mandatory test. Viewed either way, the
Illinois RFRA violates the Illinois Separation of Powers Clause.
Additionally, because the Illinois RFRA responds to no concrete
injustice, but rather grants religious actors a privileged position as
against every state and local law and policy, it violates the
Establishment Clause and is an unlawful preference under the Illinois
Constitution. Looking at examples where the religious and the secular
are performing identical functions with admirable motivations, this
preference has numerous applications that are contrary to the text and
spirit of the Illinois religious freedom provision.
Accordingly, the question remains whether and how this statute could
be amended to resolve these constitutional problems. The logical first
step, of course, would be a statute that made no reference to the Illinois
Constitution, judicial decisions, or the various standards of review used
for free exercise claims.
This step alone, however, would be
insufficient because courts look beyond a statute's facial validity to its
underlying realities to determine its context and purpose. 233 Because
the statute would still be functionally identical to the religious freedom
clause, legislative silence as to the motivation for the statute would not
ameliorate the separation of powers problem. Also, Establishment
Clause concerns would continue if the statute did not identify any
existing burden on religious practices.
The next level for amending the Illinois RFRA would be to target the
statute at the perceived gap in coverage of the First Amendment as a
result of Smith. The legislature could have responded to Smith by
drafting a RFRA statute that established a "compelling interest/least
restrictive means" test or a more moderate balancing test, in all cases
where general, neutral laws substantially burden religious practices.
The constitutionality of such a statute would be less clear-cut than the
current breed of RFRAs, but such a law would still be too broad. It
would effectively foreclose the Illinois courts from adopting the Smith
approach to Illinois religious freedom claims, and without specifying
the burden being lifted, this modified RFRA still would not be a valid
accommodation law.

233. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-40
(1993) (discussing the need to look beyond an ordinance's facial neutrality to the legislative history, scope of coverage and terms used to determine if the suppression of Santeria's religious
practice of animal sacrifice was the ordinance's objective).
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In addition, the structure of the religion clauses provides an
independent reason why even a RFRA directed at protecting rights not
covered by Smith would be problematic. While there is certainly an
area open to legislation, the instances in which religious conduct may
receive protection greater than that required by the Free Exercise Clause
without violating the Establishment Clause are narrow. The inherent
tension between these two principles means that a judicial decision with
respect to one clause is often a balance drawn between the two.
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Warmbir234 is a key
example of this balance. There, the court's holding that free exercise
does not entitle individuals to exceptions to general laws was partly
based on the rationale that to allow an exception to general laws would
grant a preference to the claimant's religion. It is reasonable to
conclude that even a modified RFRA goes too far by granting additional
protection to free exercise rights, and instead grants a statutory
preference for religious persons. The Illinois RFRA's wholesale grant
to religious objectors of a qualified right to escape valid laws thus
interferes with the judicial ability to strike the proper balance between
the two religion clauses.
Finally, if the legislature did target some specific practice that was
burdened by general laws but not protected under the Illinois
Constitution's religious freedom provisions, such a statute would be
unconstitutional, but it would not be a RFRA. A classic
accommodation, such a statute would survive an Establishment Clause
and religious preference challenge. It would not present a separation of
powers issue because it would be addressing a real world problem,
which is the province of the legislature. One example of a law that
would likely be held constitutional is one providing that individual
landlords with religious or moral objections to cohabitation are exempt
235
from marital status discrimination ordinances.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The newly passed Illinois RFRA should be struck down to clear the
way for more focused methods of eradicating unintentional stifling of
religious freedoms. Whether by laws lifting a specific burden on
religion or by context-sensitive judicial interpretations that strive for
234. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 226 N.E.2d 4 (Iil. 1967)).
235. The Legislature could find that Illinois has a longstanding policy against cohabitation and
common law marriage, see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (1l. 1979), and that there is
no demonstrable housing shortage for cohabitators.
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just outcomes, there are better and constitutional ways of responding to
dissatisfaction with the Smith decision.

